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REGULATORY FLEXIBILITIES AND TENSIONS 
IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND TRADE — AN ASIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Locknie Hsu 
ABSTRACT 
Regulatory issues relating to public health are a source of tensions 
in recent trade and investment negotiations, treaties and disputes. 
Issues arising from the intersection between public health regulation 
and trade and investment treaties have given Asian states pause for 
thought. They have led to a critical need to confront the scope and 
meaning of legal obligations vis-à-vis public health and regulatory 
objectives, and their implications for stakeholder interests. The 
intersection and resulting tensions have already led the WTO, WHO 
and WIPO to work together in an unprecedented manner to address 
some of the issues at the global level. The laws evolving around these 
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issues are demonstrating a notable divergence. As an example, the 
debate on access to medicines demonstrates divergent approaches to 
solutions. This paper examines the reasons behind legal and policy 
divergences in public health issues in the context of treaty obligations, 
with examples from Asia, and suggests that a convergence of purpose(s) 
is needed for a convergence of solutions to be found, in order to deal 
with such tensions. 
KEYWORDS: trade, investment, public health, TRIPS, flexibilities, medicines, 
FTAs, BITs 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE INTERSECTION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
TREATIES AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
Increasingly, international agreements such as bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (hereinafter ―FTAs‖) contain 
provisions which have a direct or indirect impact on public health regulation 
powers. For the most part, such agreements still deal primarily with economic 
commitments (such as trade and investment liberalization), related legal issues, 
and disputes arising from their investment provisions. Many older treaties, 
particularly the bilateral investment treaties negotiated before the 1990s, do 
not explicitly mention health at all. Public health-related provisions, such as 
general exceptions permitting departures from treaty commitments, have 
recently gained more prominence in bilateral and regional treaties. Some of 
these incorporate the familiar language of Article XX (b) of the World Trade 
Organization’s GATT 1994, or some variant of it.
1
 In some agreements, 
health-related exemption provisions have also begun to appear in the context 
of explaining the scope of indirect expropriation provisions.
2
 
Such textual shifts have occurred against a broader background of other 
legal developments. These include the rapid growth of investor-State disputes, 
some of which have begun to involve investor challenges to public-health 
protection State measures. This can be seen in the area of tobacco control, 
where a number of legal actions are ongoing in various fora against States for 
their laws on tobacco control. Some of these involve business-party claims 
against the State based on, inter alia, arguments of treaty violations in relation 
to the claimant’s intellectual property rights.
3
 States, on the other hand, argue 
                                                          
1 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade [hereinafter GATT], Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, art. 
XX reads:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
. . . 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
For examples of recent treaties with similar exception provisions, see, e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ACIA), art. 17, Feb. 26, 2009 (entered into force Mar. 29, 2012), http://as 
eansummit.mfa.go.th/14/pdf/Outcome_Document/ASEAN%20Compre%20Invest%20Agreement.pdf. 
2  See, e.g., US Model BIT 2012, Annex B, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20f 
or%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf; Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between the 
Republic of India and the Republic of Singapore (CECA), Annex 3, June 29, 2005 (entered in force 
Aug. 1, 2005), http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/India-singapore.pdf. 
3 See, e.g., TOBACCO PLAIN PACKAGING — INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, http://www.ag.gov.au/ 
tobaccoplainpackaging (last visited Feb. 11, 2015); the arbitral action brought by Philip Morris Asia 
against Australia for its plain-packaging law. 
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that they have an obligation (and right) to regulate in order to protect public 
health. This perfectly exemplifies the emerging trade-investment law and 
public health regulation interface and resulting regulatory tension faced by 
many States today. 
Apart from disputes, another interface between trade investment and 
health regulation which has at times caused regulatory tension can be seen in 
the area of pharmaceutical regulation. Two key forces are relevant to mention 
in this context. 
First, debates have arisen at the multilateral level such as in international 
fora like the World Trade Organization (hereinafter ―WTO‖) and the World 
Health Organization (hereinafter ―WHO‖) over the balance needed between 
the protection of intellectual property rights (specifically, patents and 
confidential data) for pharmaceutical inventions to promote innovation on one 
hand, and public access to affordable medicines, particularly in poorer 
countries, on the other. Specifically, the effect of obligations in The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(hereinafter ―TRIPS‖), flexibilities permitted to members under the 
Agreement and their implications for members’ access to affordable 
medicines have come under intense scrutiny and are of deep concern to many 
members. This is, especially true since a majority of WTO members are 
developing and least developed countries.
4
 
Access to medicines in emergencies or situations of extreme urgency in 
member countries has been part of this debate at the WTO, thus resulting in 
the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, and changes to the 
TRIPS regime on compulsory licensing.
5
 
Secondly, a number of TRIPS flexibilities have been reduced, through 
what are commonly referred to as ―TRIPS-plus‖ provisions, for certain States 
which have entered into FTAs containing standards stricter than those in 
TRIPS. For example, some FTAs have resulted in limiting the flexibility as to 
what may be excluded from patentability, while others have imposed stricter 
requirements for the protection of confidential data (such as clinical tests data) 
                                                          
4 In 2013, the World Health Organization [hereinafter WHO], World Trade Organization [hereinafter 
WTO] and World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO] cooperated in a landmark 
trilateral study on the interface of intellectual property rights, public health and trade, reflecting further 
the growing interfaces of these areas, divergent views and policies on them, and resulting tensions. See 
generally WHO, WIPO & WTO, PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: 
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE (2013), http://www. 
wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
5 Members have agreed to a waiver of Article 31(f) of The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights in paragraph 6 of the Declaration (the ―Paragraph 6 Waiver‖), pending 
TRIPS amendment; see generally WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003). The waiver is aimed at increasing 
access — via a combination of compulsory licensing and permission to export (in a departure from 
Article 31(f)) — for members which have no capacity to manufacture necessary medicines themselves. 
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than what TRIPS requires. Such provisions provide rights holders with a 
degree of protection exceeding that under TRIPS. Moreover, because such 
FTAs typically permit investor-State arbitration, a rights holder gains a direct 
avenue of complaint against the State for any claims of violation of these 
provisions. In the absence of such dispute avenues an aggrieved investor 
might have had to persuade its own government to take up its cause at another 
forum, such as in the state-to-state dispute system of the WTO, or in 
state-to-state negotiations or litigation. 
The increase in FTA commitments that have an impact both on the 
patenting and marketing approval of pharmaceuticals contributes to this 
intersection in significant ways. Such commitments may be TRIPS-plus and 
vary from treaty to treaty, leading to divergent requirements in signatory 
states. The landmark 2013 trilateral study of the WTO, WHO and WIPO 
mentioned above recognized that ―[c]onvergence of the different national 
systems, in conjunction with harmonization of technical requirements, can 
remove many of the transactional and human resource costs associated with 
multiple regulatory submissions in each country, including multiple testings‖, 
but that convergence of international regulation on health and medical 
technologies ―is a challenge‖, as countries have their own regulatory and 
administrative and technical systems.
6
  
There are some discernible, specific reasons for tensions faced by 
regulators, and some of these are outlined here. 
First, countries with divergent health and economic policies and priorities 
are finding that they have to come together either in the context of trade 
negotiations or other regional fora to find common ground for economic 
collaboration. The ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (hereinafter 
―TPP‖) negotiations are an example where countries including a number from 
Asia have to craft economic commitments that may have significant health 
implications. The US, for one, proposes stringent intellectual property rights 
protection under the agreement, while proposing to adopt a ―differential 
approach‖ in relation to pharmaceutical products.
 7
 In the relatively new area 
                                                          
6 WHO, WIPO & WTO, supra note 4, at 49. 
7 The 12 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement [hereinafter TPP] negotiating countries are Australia, 
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the 
United States and Vietnam. On the negotiating stance of the US in relation to intellectual property 
rights under the TPP, see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/f 
ree-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-chapter-chapter-negotiating-9 (last visited Mar. 5, 
2015); Stakeholder Input Sharpens, Focuses U.S. Work on Pharmaceutical IPR in the TPP, THE 
OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov., 2013), https://ustr. 
gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2013/November/stakeholder-input-sharpens-focuses-us-
work-on-pharmaceutical-IP-in-TPP; Michael Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative, 
Remarks at the Center for American Progress: A Values-Driven Trade Policy (2014), at 9, http://cdn. 
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Center-for-American-Progress-Remarks-Ambassad
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of biologic medicines in particular, the agreement may set new, high 
standards of protection for innovators which may affect competition in the 
supply of such products or similar products, and their prices.
8
  
Another broad, important regional effort is that in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter ―ASEAN‖), which has set a target of 
establishing an ASEAN Economic Community by the end of 2015. ASEAN’s 
integration plan also includes the establishment of a Political-Security 
Community and a Socio-Cultural Community (which addresses public health 
issues in ASEAN). These integration plans also require officials from 
ASEAN’s diverse legal systems to jointly address economic and health issues 
(among others). At the same time, ASEAN is negotiating with six external 
trade partners to form the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(hereinafter ―RCEP‖) agreement.
9
 In another evolving initiative under APEC, 
another large and diverse group of economies from the Asia-Pacific region 
including Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Russia, Singapore and the US are likely to launch into trade 
negotiations in the foreseeable future.
10
 Interestingly, none of these trade 
groupings mentioned above so far include India, which is a large player in the 
manufacture of pharmaceutical products. 
Secondly, countries in Asia have addressed the use of flexibilities under 
the TRIPS Agreement in diverse ways. For example, India and Thailand have 
exercised their right to make use of compulsory licensing in pharmaceuticals 
(not without legal challenges in courts by pharmaceutical companies) while 
others have not. Others, such as Singapore, have taken the stance that it would 
not use this unless it were a national emergency.
11
 
Thirdly, demandeur States continue to request TRIPS-plus treaty 
protection in trade negotiations, such as those in TPP.
12
 Four ASEAN states 
                                                                                                                                    
or-Froman-2-18-14.pdf. See also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectu 
al-property (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
8  See Hatch, Kerry Call for Strong IP Standards to Protect Biologics Data in Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Negotiations, THE UNITED STATE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=9fc0a1bb-e420-418a-835c-14512434a4
36. 
9 See REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/ 
Pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
10 See ANNEX A – THE BEIJING ROADMAP FOR APEC’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE REALIZATION OF THE 
FTAAP, http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_ann 
exa.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
11 See Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Import, WTO (Aug. 30, 2003), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm. 
12 See, e.g., Gabrielle Chan & Michael Safi, WikiLeaks' Free Trade Documents Reveal ―Drastic‖ 
Australian Concessions, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/a 
ustralia-news/2014/oct/17/wikileaks-trans-pacific-partnership-drastic-australian-concessions. The U.S.’ 
stated objectives, see also TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: SUMMARY OF U.S. OBJECTIVES, 
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives (last visited Mar. 5, 2015); and other statements, 
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with varying levels of economic development, healthcare policies and 
Intellectual Property Right (hereinafter ―IPR‖) priorities are participants in 
these negotiations (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam). 
Among these, there are varying levels of emphasis on IPR protection, with 
Singapore being probably the strongest IPR proponent, as it explicitly aims to 
be an ―IP hub‖ as well as a hub for the development of biomedical products 
and services.
13
 
In an economically diverse region such as Asia which simultaneously 
encompasses high-income countries and least developed countries, differing 
priority health needs and abilities of citizens to pay for medicines can also 
give rise to divergent trade, IP and health laws and policies.
 14
 As will be 
explained later, countries also enter into economic agreements with 
non-economic objectives in mind. These may include geo-political 
considerations, which may condition the acceptance (or not) of certain 
trade-offs (which may therefore have an impact on public health policy) in the 
negotiation of such agreements.
 
This article provides some examples of the 
regulatory aspects of the IP-health nexus in member countries of ASEAN
 15
 
and some of its regional trade partners, such as China, India, Korea and 
Japan.
16
 These represent some of the most active countries in FTA 
negotiations in the region over the last decade. 
  
                                                                                                                                    
see, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 7; OUTLINES OF TPP, https://ustr.gov/tpp/o 
utlines-of-TPP (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
13 See generally Singapore IP Steering Committee, IP Hub Master Plan — Developing Singapore as a 
Global IP Hub in Asia (2013), http://www.ipos.gov.sg/Portals/0/Press%20Release/IP%20HU 
B%20MASTER%20PLAN%20REPORT%202%20APR%202013.pdf. See also THE SINGAPORE 
ECONOMIC REVIEW COMMITTEE, ECONOMIC REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT AND SUB-COMMITTEE 
REPORTS, available at http://www.mti.gov.sg/AboutMTI/Pages/Economic%20Review%20Commi 
ttee.aspx. 
14 See generally SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN, PATENT AND TRADE DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2012). 
15 For Association of Southeast Asian Nations [hereinafter ASEAN] countries, regional forces such as 
the ASEAN economic integration plan are at work as well, with an ASEAN Economic Community 
[hereinafter AEC] to be set up by the end of 2015. The AEC forms part of a greater integration plan 
which includes two other Communities or ―pillars‖, namely, the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community (APSC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community [hereinafter ASCC]. The ASCC and 
other ASEAN statements have referred to the importance of ensuring affordable healthcare and 
medication — see, e.g., Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations 
―Bali Concord III‖ [hereinafter Bali Concord III], Part C, Socio-Cultural Cooperation, § 3, ¶ (c) (2011), 
http://www. preventionweb.net/files/23664_baliconcordiii28readyforsignature29.pdf.  
16 The UN Statistics Division utilizes divisions in Asia according Central Asia, Eastern Asia, 
Southeast Asia and South Asia; see GEOGRAPHICAL REGION AND COMPOSITION, 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/me thods/m49/m49regin.htm#asia (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). The Asian 
Development Bank [hereinafter ADB] utilizes a list of 48 countries as being part of Asia and the 
Pacific. See ADB COUNTRIES AND REGIONS, http://www.adb.org/countries/main (last visited Feb. 11, 
2015).  
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II. TRIPS: MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND REGULATORY SPACE 
The TRIPS Agreement provides a minimum set of standards for the 
protection of IPRs for WTO members. This means that while members may 
exceed these minimum standards or systemic requirements, they are not under 
any compulsion to do so. This leaves them with a degree of flexibility in 
regulating intellectual property rights beyond these minimum requirements. 
This was the nature of the agreement reached by founding members of the 
WTO through a series of negotiating trade-offs in various areas of trade. 
In establishing minimum requirements, the TRIPS Agreement has been 
the catalyst for a certain degree of convergence in member States’ laws on 
IPRs. While TRIPS does not mandate that the implementing national laws 
should be identical, they must at the very minimum provide for certain 
features (such as availability of a system for patent and trademark 
registration), a minimum scope of what is patentable, and a minimum level of 
enforcement and institutional structures for this purpose. With the exception 
of least developed countries (LDCs) that enjoy transitional exemptions, WTO 
members are therefore expected to comply with these requirements.
17
 
III. TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES 
As the TRIPS Agreement provides minimum requirements for national 
patent systems, WTO members enjoy a degree of flexibility with regard to 
national laws on pharmaceutical patents and their implementation. Three areas 
of such flexibility serve as illustrations here but these are by no means 
exhaustive. 
A. Non-patentable Subject Matter 
First, Article 27 of TRIPS permits members if they so choose to exclude 
certain subject matter from being patentable. As a result, within this 
permissive framework, members have patentability provisions of varying 
scope in their national laws. Articles 27.2 and 27.3 provide, respectively: 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of 
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to 
                                                          
17 LDCs’ TRIPS exemptions, see, e.g., RESPONDING TO EAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES’ SPECIAL 
NEEDS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
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protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not 
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
(a)diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals; 
(b)plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other 
than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, 
Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination 
thereof.  The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed 
four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
B. Data Protection Obligations 
Secondly, TRIPS permits the use of undisclosed data of a party provided 
that certain requirements are met. Article 39.3 provides: 
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products 
which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed 
test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable 
effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In 
addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except 
where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to 
ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use. 
(Emphasis added) 
The origination of the undisclosed data must pass a threshold test: 
―origination . . . which involves a considerable effort‖. Next, the protection 
above is directed at guarding against ―unfair commercial use‖, which is not 
defined in the TRIPS Agreement. Members may depart from the protection of 
such data ―where necessary to protect the public‖. This is a wide provision 
limited by showing ―necessity‖, and could arguably include the protection of 
public health.  
Countries in Asia/ASEAN do not all have the same standards or 
procedures for data exclusivity protection. Some countries such as Malaysia 
have developed a registration system to implement the flexibility provided by 
Art. 39, as will be explained below.  
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C. Compulsory Licensing 
Thirdly, TRIPS permits members to make use of compulsory licensing 
(i.e. licensing of a patented product without the consent of the patent owner) 
under certain circumstances. Article 31 allows members to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or cases of extreme urgency, in which case 
compulsory licensing may be called into use. The Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health reiterated such flexibilities.
18
 As a result, 
members’ laws may differ on the circumstances under which compulsory 
licensing may be permitted. 
In addition, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement provides a broad 
exception:  
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and 
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement. (Emphasis added) 
Outside the WTO, several FTAs contain provisions that circumscribe the 
areas of flexibility mentioned. Such provisions, which impose stricter 
requirements than TRIPS, are often referred to as ―TRIPS-plus‖ provisions. 
For example, the scope for limiting subject matter that is patentable has been 
restricted in some FTAs. As a result, such states are arguably at a relative 
regulatory disadvantage as compared with those that still enjoy the benefits of 
Articles 27.2 and 27.3. 
Two FTAs signed by Asian states with the United States contain 
examples of TRIPS-plus provisions. These are the US-Singapore FTA 
(hereinafter ―USSFTA‖) and the Korea-US FTA (hereinafter ―KORUS‖). 
Both are high-income Asian countries with geopolitical interests in having 
strengthened ties with the US. Evidently, despite the fact that these provisions 
would sacrifice some of the flexibility under TRIPS, the calculation had been 
made that they are acceptable.
19
 
  
                                                          
18 See generally WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
(Nov. 20, 2001). 
19 See generally Ong Ye Kung, Lessons from the USSFTA Negotiations, in THE UNITED STATES 
SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT — HIGHLIGHTS AND INSIGHTS 33 (Tommy Koh & Chang Li 
Lin eds., 2004); Woon Yin Liew, Intellectual Property Rights, in THE UNITED STATES SINGAPORE 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT — HIGHLIGHTS AND INSIGHTS 123 (Tommy Koh & Chang Li Lin eds., 
2004). 
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IV. TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES: REGULATORY APPROACHES IN ASIA 
Before discussing divergences in trade and health policies, it should be 
noted that in the use of TRIPS flexibilities, there is some divergence in the 
laws and policies of Asian countries. This is hardly surprising since, as 
mentioned, the TRIPS Agreement mandates minimum standards of IPR 
protection and enforcement, and leaves it open to member states to determine 
the precise content of their laws and regulations in areas within the 
flexibilities. The following are some examples of flexibilities used in 
divergent ways in Asia. 
A. Patentability 
As mentioned, Article 27 of TRIPS permits a degree of flexibility with 
regard to the scope of patentability, a basic requirement for an inventor to gain 
exclusive rights in the national laws of WTO members. Patentability is thus 
an important threshold matter which helps authorities determine whether to 
grant exclusive rights to a pharmaceutical innovator. Such a grant could 
greatly affect the price of the resulting pharmaceutical product, and therefore, 
the public’s ultimate access to it. 
In Asian jurisdictions, this flexibility has been exercised in a number of 
different ways. These include how the laws treat known pharmaceutical 
substances for which new uses have been found. Given that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not specifically address such ―inventions‖ members are free 
to determine their patentability in national systems.  
In India, for example, for a known drug to be patentable the Indian 
Patents Act requires proof of improvement in therapeutic efficacy; merely 
presenting a different form of a known drug without proof of improved 
therapeutic efficacy is insufficient for the new product to be patentable.
20
 
Similarly, in the Philippines, ―enhanced efficacy‖ is required before such 
products may be patented.
21
  
Under Chinese patent law, while second medical use is not specifically 
addressed, the relevant provision on patentability stipulates ―Inventions and 
utility models for which patent rights are to be granted shall be ones which are 
                                                          
20 The Indian Supreme Court recently ruled on the relevant provision (section 3(d) of the Indian 
Patents Act) in a landmark case, Novartis AG v. Union of India & Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 
2706-2716 of 2013, Civil Appeal Nos. 2728 of 2013, Civil Appeal Nos. 2717-2727 of 2013 (Apr. 1, 
2013), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf; see especially The Patent 
(Amendment) Act, 1970 [hereinafter Patent Act of India], No. 39, Acts of Parliament, ¶¶ 182-95, 1970 
(India), http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_Act_1970_28012013_book.pdf. 
21 See The Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008, Rep. Act No. 9502, 
§§ 22.1, 26(b), (2008) (Phil.); Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Republic Act No. 9502, 
Administrative Order No. 2008-01, 2008 (Phil.). 
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novel, creative and of practical use. . . . Novelty means that the invention or 
utility model concerned is not an existing technology . . . . Creativity means 
that, compared with the existing technologies, the invention possesses 
prominent substantive features and indicates remarkable 
advancements . . . .‖(Emphasis added).
 22
 
Many other countries in Asia, however, do not explicitly require such 
improvement or enhancement in their patent laws, but rather, leave the 
national IP authorities to make an assessment based on the minimum 
requirements for patentability required under the TRIPS Agreement (that the 
invention be new, involve an inventive step and is capable of industrial 
application
23
). This has led to divergent practices.
24
 
In Singapore, such inventions are patentable without any express 
legislative requirement of an improvement/enhancement in therapeutic 
efficacy. This can be seen from section 14(7) of the Patents Act and from 
Intellectual Property of Singapore (IPOS) practice.
25
 Under Thai law and 
practice it appears that second medical use claims are no longer patentable.
26
 
Lao PDR and Vietnamese law do not provide for the patenting of second 
medical uses of known products.
27
 
These divergences have implications for countries aiming at greater 
integration such as those in ASEAN. This is because the patentability (or not) 
of pharmaceuticals for which new uses can be found may affect the pricing of 
such pharmaceuticals in ASEAN member countries. Divergences also have 
implications when ASEAN is negotiating an FTA with an external partner 
which demands, for example, increased patentability scope to include second 
                                                          
22 Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong Han Guo Zhuan Li Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [The Patent Law of 
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 
1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985) (amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, 
effective 1 Oct. 2009) [hereinafter Patent Law of PRC], art. 22 (China). 
23 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS] art. 27(1), 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
24 One example is the acceptability of ―Swiss-type‖ claims in patent applications involving known 
products: these appear to be acceptable in Singapore but not, for instance, in Thailand. For an 
explanation of a ―Swiss-type‖ claim, see EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION, 
available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/g_vi_7_1.htm. Such claims 
are no longer accepted by the European Patent Office. 
25  See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF SINGAPORE [hereinafter IPOS], EXAMINATION 
GUIDELINES FOR PATENT APPLICATIONS AT IPOS 234-35 (Feb. 14, 2014), available at http://www. 
ipos.gov.sg/Portals/0/Patents/Examination%20Guidelines%20for%20Patent%20Applications%20at%2
0IPOS_Feb%202014.pdf. 
26 The practice changed in 2011; see Jennifer D. Fajelagutan, The End of ―Swiss-type‖ Use Claims in 
Thailand, ASIA IP (July 1, 2011), http://www.asiaiplaw.com/article/41/527/. 
27 For Lao People's Democratic Republic, see Law on Intellectual Property, No. 01/NA, art. 13 (as 
amended, 2011) (Laos), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/la/la025en.pdf. For 
Vietnam, see Law on Intellectual Property [hereinafter Law on Intellectual Property of Vietnam], No. 
50/2005/QH11 of November 29, 2005, arts. 4.12, 58, 59, 60 (as amended, 2009) (Viet.), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/vn/vn063en.pdf. 
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medical uses of known medicines, contrary to some of the existing laws, as 
there often appears to be no common negotiating position in these matters. 
Finally, from a foreign investor’s point of view, the divergent regulatory 
requirements can complicate matters for innovators seeking patent protection 
within the region for their pharmaceutical products.
28
 While many other 
factors (such as the imposition of tariffs by States, the presence of corruption 
and poor health infrastructure or health products delivery) can contribute to 
the costs of medicines, transaction costs can also add to the costs of 
end-products, which in turn affects public availability. 
B. Bolar Exceptions in Asia 
WTO case law has confirmed that members may, under the TRIPS 
Agreement, make use of the exception in Article 30 in particular to permit 
activities for research and preparation for obtaining pharmaceutical marketing 
approval.
29
 This case law yielded what has come to be known as the Bolar 
exception.
30
 States in Asia have therefore included research and Bolar 
exceptions in their patent laws. Examples of such countries are: Brunei 
Darussalam,
31
 China,
32
 India,
33
 Malaysia,
34
 Singapore
35
 and Thailand.
36
 
Hong Kong
37
 and Lao PDR laws, on the other hand, do not include a Bolar 
exception provision. Indonesian law provides for a research exception but not 
a Bolar exception.
38
 Again, for ASEAN, the divergences may present 
challenges should matters arise in negotiations with an external partner 
regarding this type of exception. 
                                                          
28 While many countries in Asia are parties to the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Patent Cooperation 
Treaty, June 19, 1970 (amended on Sept. 28, 1979, modified on Oct. 3, 2001), 9 I.L.M. 978; which 
facilitates and simplifies patent filing across countries, there are some that are not, such as Cambodia 
and Myanmar. Cambodia is however a party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property. See THE PCT NOW HAS 148 CONTRACTING STATES, http://www.wipo.int/pct/en 
/pct_contracting_states.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).  
29 See generally Panel Report, Canada – Protection of Pharmaceuticals Products, WT/DS114/R (Apr. 
7, 2000). 
30 The exception derives its name from a US court decision in Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F. 2d 858 (Fed. Circ. 1984). See also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 381-82 (3d ed. 2008). 
31 Constitution of Brunei Darussalam (Order made under Article 83(3)), Patents Order, No. S 57, Oct., 
2011, §§ 64(2)(b), (2)(g) (Brunei). 
32 Patent Law of PRC, supra note 22, art. 69(5). 
33 Patent Act of India, supra note 20, § 107A. 
34 Id. § 37 (1A). 
35 Id. § 66 (2) (g). 
36 Id. § 36 (4). 
37 See Patents Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 514, § 75 (H.K.). 
38 Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 19 Year 2002 Regarding Copyright, art. 16(3), available 
at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/es/files/30382/11424187703id_copyright_2002_en.pdf/id_copyright 
_2002_en.pdf (Indon.). 
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C. Approaches to Compulsory Licensing and its Use in Asia 
Under Art. 5(A) of the Paris Convention, a signatory state ―shall have the 
right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory 
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.‖ 
Art. 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits the use of compulsory licensing 
in circumstances defined thereunder. In addition, WTO members have agreed 
to waive the requirements of Art. 31(f) to permit exportation of 
pharmaceuticals under compulsory licensing in certain circumstances, in what 
is known as the ―paragraph 6‖ mechanism.
39
 Compulsory licensing may, in 
particular, be employed to remedy the anti-competitive practices of 
businesses.
40
 
The use of compulsory licensing in Asia in relation to patented 
pharmaceuticals has been divergent. In recent years countries such as India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand
41
 have utilized compulsory licensing. 
Notably, in Thailand, the pharmaceuticals subject to the compulsory licenses 
have included those for treating non-communicable diseases. In the case of 
India, the first compulsory license was issued and challenged with respect to a 
medicine used for cancer treatment. In a dispute by the patent-holder, Bayer 
Corporation, a US-based pharmaceutical company, the Bombay High Court 
upheld the compulsory license under India’s Patents Act.
42
 
On the other hand countries such as Singapore have not, and Singapore 
has announced that it would use compulsory licensing only in emergencies or 
extremely urgent situations.
43
 Such use is provided for under the Singapore 
                                                          
39 See generally WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, supra note 5; WTO, Amendment of the Trips Agreement, WT/L/641 
(Dec. 6, 2005). 
40 TRIPS, supra note 23, arts. 31(k), 8(2), 40; also address anti-competition measures. 
41 In 2005, Taiwan had also issued a compulsory license, for Tamiflu; see Kathrin Hille, Taiwan 
employs compulsory licensing for Tamiflu, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 25, 2005, 4:17 PM), http://www.ft. 
com/cms/s/0/cebeb882-5dcb-11da-be9c-0000779e2340.html#axzz3KFBahOyn. See generally Ralf 
Boscheck, Intellectual Property Rights & Compulsory Licensing: The Case of Pharmaceuticals in 
Emerging Markets, 35(4) WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 621 (2012); Sakda Thanitcul & Matthew 
Lim Braslow, Compulsory Licensing of Chronic Disease Pharmaceuticals in Thailand, 37 THAI J. 
PHARM. SCI. 61 (2013); Raadhika Gupta, Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS: How Far it Addresses 
Public Health Concerns in Developing Nations, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. R. 357 (2010). 
42 See generally Patent Act of India, supra note 20. See Bayer Corporation v. NATCO Pharma Ltd., 
Writ Petition No. 1323 of 2013, Bombay H.C., available at http://bombayhig 
hcourt.nic.in/generatenewauth.php?auth=cGF0aD0uL2RhdGEvanVkZ2VtZW50cy8yMDE0LyZmbm
FtZT1PU1dQMTEyODEzLnBkZiZzbWZsYWc9Tg== (India). 
43 See Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, supra note 11. In addition to 
Singapore, other countries taking this stance are Hong Kong China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao 
China, Mexico, Qatar, Chinese Taipei, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. For information on various 
countries’ laws implementing the ―paragraph 6‖ system, see Members’ Laws Implementing the 
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Patents Act, defined not as ―compulsory licensing‖, but under use ―for the 
services of the Government‖.
44
 Separately, another provision sets out the use 
of ―compulsory licensing‖ for the specific purposes of remedying 
anti-competitive practices.
45
 
China has legislated to provide for compulsory licensing although it has 
not yet issued any compulsory licenses. In 2003 and 2005, China issued 
regulations on compulsory licenses to address public health problems.
46
 In 
2012, a revised set of regulations was issued, which repeals these earlier 
measures.
47
 Under the 2012 measures, Articles 5 through 8 determine the 
situations in which a compulsory license may be issued/applied for. Article 5 
provides for situations of a patent holder’s failure to work his patent and 
where a patent holder is shown to have ―monopolistic actions‖. Article 6 
permits the granting of compulsory licenses in the following situations: 
―emergency or irregular event of the state, or for the purposes of public 
interest‖. Article 7 permits the granting of compulsory licenses for 
manufacture and export of patented medicines in certain situations (reflecting 
the ―paragraph 6‖ waiver mentioned earlier). 
It is obviously a difficult balance to achieve between providing for 
intellectual property protection seen to be a factor contributing to innovative 
activity in many Asian countries and ensuring that the public has adequate 
access to pharmaceuticals at affordable pricing. As in many other countries, 
Asian governments have the challenge of finding this balance, particularly in 
the face of trade partner demands, such as in the context of an FTA or other 
negotiations. 
  
                                                                                                                                    
―Paragraph 6‖ System, WTO (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/par6l 
aws_e.htm. 
44 Patents Act [hereinafter Patents Act of Singapore], Cap. 221, §§ 56-62, (1994) (as amended, 2005) 
(Sing.). 
45 Id. § 55. 
46 She Ji Gong Gong Jian Kang Wen Ti De Zhuan Li Shi Shi Jiang Zhi Xu Ke Ban Fa (涉及公共健康
问题的专利实施强制许可办法) [Measures of January 1, 2006, for Compulsory License on Patent 
Implementation Concerning Public Health Problems] (promulgated by Order No. 37 of the State Intell. 
Prop. Off., Nov. 29, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (Lawinfochina) (China).  
47 Zhuan Li Shi Shi Jiang Zhi Xu Ke Ban Fa (Guo Jia Zhi Shi Chan Quan Ju Ju Chang Ling Di 31 
Hao Gong Bu) (专利实施强制许可办法 (国家知识产权局局长令第 31 号公布)) [Measures for 
Compulsory Licensing of Patent Exploitation] (promulgated by Order No. 31 of the State Intell. 
Prop.Off., June 13, 2003) (Lawinfochina) (China); Zhuan Li Shi Shi Jiang Zhi Xu Ke Ban Fa (Guo Jia 
Zhi Shi Chan Quan Ju Ju Chang Ling Di 64 Hao Gong Bu) (专利实施强制许可办法 (国家知识产权
局局长令第 64号公布) ) [Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Exploitation] (promulgated 
by Order No. 64 of the State Intell. Prop. Off., Mar. 15, 2012) (Lawinfochina) (China). 
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D. The Impact of FTA Commitments on Public Health Regulation in 
Asia: Some Examples 
A number of Asian countries have been active in negotiating FTAs in the 
last 15 years and some of these agreements contain obligations that impact 
upon public health. Below are some examples. 
1. Example 1: Expanding Patentable Subject Matter Beyond TRIPS Art. 
27 Requirements. — Considering patentability is a key threshold requirement 
for the granting of a patent monopoly, it serves a critical gate-keeping 
function. The broader the scope of patentable matter, the greater will be the 
number and types of patents potentially granted.  
Art. 27 of the TRIPS Agreement provides a minimum scope of patentable 
subject matter. Beyond this, WTO members have flexibility in determining 
what may not be patentable under their national laws. A number of FTAs now 
contain commitments on the scope of patentable subject matter which limits 
such flexibilities, primarily by increasing such scope. In other words, the 
commitments seek to significantly reduce what may be treated as 
non-patentable by national authorities. 
The USSFTA is an example of an FTA which reduces the scope of 
non-patentable matter. Art. 16.7 provides for the Parties to exclude such 
inventions from patentability as are provided for in Arts. 27.2 and 27.3(a) of 
the TRIPS Agreement. This therefore disallows them from excluding those 
inventions that are mentioned in Art. 27.3(b) of TRIPS.
48
 
Another example is the KORUS, in which Art. 18.8 also reduces what 
may be excluded from patentability, as compared with Art. 27(3) of TRIPS. 
The Japan-Switzerland Agreement, on the other hand, preserves a version 
of Art. 27.3(b).
49
 
An important implication arising from this for pharmaceutical inventions 
is that it expands the potential for patentability, and therefore, the scope of 
patent monopolies that may be granted. In turn this means that possibly more 
types of pharmaceutical inventions will enjoy patent protection, to the 
                                                          
48 TRIPS, supra note 23, art. 27.3(b) provides for the following:  
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The 
provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement. 
49  See Agreement on Free Trade and Economic Partnership between Japan and the Swiss 
Confederation, art. 117.3, Sept. 1, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/switzerland/epa 
0902/agreement.pdf. See also Bayer Corporation v. NATCO Pharma Ltd., supra note 42 and 
accompanying text.  
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exclusion of competitors’ use or supply of such products or similar 
alternatives. 
2. Example 2: Limitation of Patent Opposition Opportunities. — Some 
national patent systems provide for an opportunity to oppose a patent 
application, as such oppositions are viewed as a means to test the strength and 
legitimacy of the application. The TRIPS Agreement is silent about such 
proceedings. In some FTAs, however, parties have agreed to eliminate patent 
opposition proceedings prior to the granting of a patent.  In the 
US-Singapore FTA, for example, Art. 16.7 explicitly removes the right to 
hold any pre-grant opposition proceedings: 
Each Party shall provide that a patent may only be revoked on 
grounds that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent, or 
that pertain to the insufficiency of or unauthorized amendments to 
the patent specification, non-disclosure or misrepresentation of 
prescribed, material particulars, fraud, and misrepresentation. 
Where such proceedings include opposition proceedings, a Party 
may not make such proceedings available prior to the grant of the 
patent. 
Any challenge has to be brought post-grant under, for example, 
provisions on revocation of a granted patent. Under US and EU law, 
post-grant proceedings are available; the US law provides a ―pre-issuance 
protest‖ process while a patent application is still pending. Far from being 
removed or reduced in importance, this pre-grant process was in fact 
expanded by statute in 2012.
50
 
                                                          
50 Leahy-Smith U.S. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see Ken 
Burchfiel, New U.S. Opposition Proceedings Provide Strategic Avenues for Patent Challengers, 
USPTO PATENT TRIALS (Nov. 5, 2011), http://usptopost-grant.com/2011/11/05/new-u-s-oppositio 
n-proceedings-provide-strategic-avenues-for-patent-challengers/; AMERICA INVENTS ACT 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/faqs-preissuance-submiss 
ions.jsp (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). The implementing rules setting out an amended ―protest‖ process 
in THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1.291, 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web /offices/pac/mpep/. See generally Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, 
Proposed AIA Implementation Rules: Preissuance Submissions in Pending Applications, PHARMA 
PATENTS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2012/01/26/proposed-aia-imp 
lementation-rules-preissuance-submissions-in-pending-applications/. See FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, TO IMPROVE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY 18 (2003). For the EU, see OPPOSITIONS, http://www.epo.org/applying/europ 
ean/oppositions.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). Under the UK Patents Act 1977 (as amended) a third 
party may make ―observations‖ after publication of an application, before the grant of a patent. While 
this step may not amount to an opposition proceeding it provides third parties with a useful 
opportunity to provide the Registrar with pertinent information which the comptroller ―shall 
consider . . . in accordance with the rules‖. 
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Pre-grant opposition proceedings still exist in some Asian jurisdictions 
such as India, Indonesia and Thailand,
51
 while Vietnamese law permits third 
parties to ―express opinions‖ on a pending application.
52
 
3. Example 3: Pharmaceutical Patent Term Extensions. — Under Article 
33 of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO members must provide a minimum patent 
protection period of 20 years from the filing date. WTO members are 
therefore free to provide for patent protection extensions beyond this duration. 
Certain FTAs include obligations to extend the duration of patents for 
unreasonable delays
.53
 As a result several FTAs contain commitments to 
grant extensions to make up for delays in the patent registration process 
marketing approval process, or both. An example of such an FTA is the 
USSFTA, as a result of which Singapore added a patent extension term 
provision in its patent law allowing extensions of up to 5 years.
54
 
4. Example 4: Patent Linkages and Data Exclusivity. — One issue which 
has arisen in the context of FTA commitments particularly those associated 
with various US FTAs is that of patent linkage. Patent registration authorities 
usually operate independently of pharmaceutical marketing approval 
authorities (and vice versa). However, certain FTAs contain commitments 
which link the two areas (hence, ―patent linkage‖), requiring the latter 
authorities to monitor whether pharmaceutical products which form the 
subject matter of marketing approval applications are covered under any 
existing patents. Essentially, such commitments make the marketing approval 
authorities a watchdog of sorts for the patent-holders, as the authorities are 
obliged to trigger certain processes if a patent exists for the product (or a 
similar product). This kind of linkage greatly facilitates the work of 
pharmaceutical patent-holders as the authorities serve as a notification node 
for obtaining alerts and information on potential competitors’ products when 
such applications are filed. Apart from the notification function, such 
commitments may also require signatory states not to permit marketing 
approval to competitive (generic) products for a stipulated number of years if 
                                                          
51 Patent Act of India permits this. For commentaries on this process in India; see also JAKKRIT 
KUANPOTH, PATENT RIGHTS IN PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 78-79 (2010); 
Shivnath Tripathi, Relevance of Pre-Grant Opposition under Indian Law (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2365463. Under the Law of the Republic of 
Indonesia Number 14 Year 2001, regarding Patents Law, art. 45 (Indon.), a person may file comments 
and/or objections prior to a grant, after announcement of an application. As to pre-grant opposition 
proceedings under the Thailand Patent Patent Act B.E. 2522 (1979), as amended by the Patent Act (No. 
2) B.E 2535 (1992) and the Patent Act (No. 3) B.E. 2542 (1999), §§ 31, 32, 34 (Thai.). On patent 
opposition systems in general, see generally WIPO Secretariat, Opposition Systems, SCP/14/5 (Dec. 
11, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=130408. 
52 Law on Intellectual Property of Vietnam, supra note 27, art. 112. 
53 See, e.g., United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter USSFTA], art. 16.8(4), May 6, 
2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026. 
54 Patents Act of Singapore, supra note 44, § 36A. 
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such approval is sought on the basis of information or data submitted by the 
patent-holder for its products. 
The USSFTA and KORUS also contain obligations with respect to data 
exclusivity for pharmaceutical enterprises. Such provisions prohibit the use of 
data of an innovator within a certain period for purposes of providing 
marketing approval to a party to produce the same or similar products, unless 
the production is with the consent of the innovator.
55
 The recently concluded 
EU-Singapore FTA text (which presently awaits ratification by the EU and 
implementing legislation by Singapore) also contains such provisions.
 56
 
Such commitments clearly exceed what the TRIPS Agreement requires, 
and in effect create another ―layer‖ of protection for patent-holders. Examples 
of these commitments can be found in KORUS and USSFTA.
57
 USSFTA, 
Singapore amended its legislation in order to accommodate the new patent 
linkage system.
58
 Other US FTAs containing such linkage commitments are 
the US-Australia, US-Chile and US-Peru FTAs. 
59
 The TPP negotiations will 
potentially introduce such provisions to participant countries as well.
60
 
In 2011, Malaysia issued a Directive on Data Exclusivity setting out the 
scope of such exclusivity and the circumstances in which a departure may be 
permitted.
61
 This implements the flexibility provided to WTO members under 
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement, outlined above. Under the Malaysian 
system, data exclusivity is subject to a formal application process and must be 
applied for from the Director of Pharmaceutical Services. The Directive 
governs such applications and the grounds upon which they may be granted or 
                                                          
55 USSFTA, supra note 53, art. 16.8; Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America 
and the Republic of Korea [hereinafter KORUS], art. 18.9, Mar. 15, 2012, https://ustr.gov/sites 
/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file273_12717.pdf . 
56 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and The Republic of Singapore [hereinafter 
EU-Singapore FTA], art. 11.33, Oct. 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/trado 
c_152844.pdf. 
57 See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 344-46 (2010). On the 
KORUS patent linkage provisions, see Confirmation Letter (Disputes Involving Patent Linkage), 
KORUS, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file941_1296 
7.pdf; see generally Seong Joo Jeong, Patent-Drug Approval Linkage in Korea Under Korea-U.S. FTA 
— Based on Comparative Study on U.S. Hatch-Waxman Act and Canadian Patented Medicines (Notice 
of Compliance) Regulation (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407320. On 
the Singapore patent linkage provisions, see generally Kin Wah Chow, Pharmaceutical Related IP 
Protection in Singapore, LAW GAZETTE (2007), http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2007-12/feature1.htm. 
58 See The Medicines Act [hereinafter The Medicines Act of Singapore], Cap. 176, § 12A, 1985 Rev. 
Ed (Sing.). 
59 See generally Ruth Lopert & Deborah Gleeson, The High Price of ―Free Trade‖: US Trade 
Agreements and Access to Medicines, 41(1) J. L. MED. & ETH. 199 (2013). 
60 See generally SOURCES: USTR to Float New Access to Medicines Ideas at Next TPP Round, 31(8) 
INSIDE US TRADE (2013), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/Public-Content-Speci 
al-Promo/sources-ustr-to-float-new-access-to-medicines-ideas-at-next-tpp-round/menu-id-1037.html. 
61 The text of the Directive is available at Malaysia’s National Pharmaceutical Control Bureau website, 
see generally DATA EXCLUSIVITY, portal.bpfk.gov.my/index.cfm?&menuid=105&parentid=82 (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2015).  
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refused. The Directive applies both to new drugs containing new chemical 
entities (NCE) and to second indications of a registered drug product. If an 
application is successful, the grant will be notified in a Register of Data 
Exclusivity maintained and published by the Government.
62  
The public 
health-related departure is provided in paragraph 5: 
5. Nothing in the Data Exclusivity shall: 
(i) apply to situations where compulsory licenses have been issued 
or the implementation of any other measures consistent with the 
need to protect public health and ensure access to medicines for all; 
or 
(ii) prevent the Government from taking any necessary action to 
protect public health, national security, non-commercial public use, 
national emergency, public health crisis, or other extremely urgent 
circumstances declared by the government.
63
 
As Malaysia is a negotiating party to the TPP, it will need to carefully 
consider any negotiating demands that may change the scope and operation of 
the flexibility reflected above. By contrast, while Singapore has made 
commitments in the USSFTA on data exclusivity, it does not have a similar 
implementation regime. Rather, such protection arises from amendments 
made in the Patent Act, which followed the FTA.
64
 
5. Example 5: Pricing and reimbursement commitments affecting 
pharmaceuticals. — KORUS contains obligations affecting 
reimbursement-related measures with respect to pharmaceutical products.
65
 
The EU-Singapore FTA text also contains such provisions.
66
 
It could be questioned whether giving up of certain flexibilities enshrined 
in the TRIPS Agreement might be termed as ―WTO-minus‖ in the sense that 
countries are subscribing to less than their WTO rights.
67
 It is suggested here 
that while it would be a violation to withdraw an obligation from the 
agreement without justification, the giving up of a right is akin to a waiver of 
that right, which is open to a WTO member to do. In fact, it is often observed 
that the TRIPS Agreement stipulates a minimum set of requirements, so that a 
WTO member may choose to adopt stronger disciplines or narrower 
                                                          
62 Register of Data Exclusivity Granted in Malaysia & Register of AI Data Exclusivity Granted in 
Malaysia, id. 
63 Id.¶ 5. 
64 See The Medicines Act of Singapore, supra note 58, §§ 19A-D. 
65 KORUS supra note 55, arts. 16.7(7), (8). 
66 See EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 56, Annex 2-C. 
67 I thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this question. 
2015] REGULATORY FLEXIBILITIES AND TENSIONS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND TRADE 
177 
 
protection for itself under the terms of the agreement. Such action would, 
indeed, by TRIPS or more broadly, WTO plus. 
D. Participation in Health-Related Treaties and State Relationships 
with Commercial Entities in Related Industries. 
Not all Asian states are party to certain multilateral, health-related treaties. 
For example, signatories to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
established under the auspices of the WHO,
68
 include China, Korea, Japan 
and all ASEAN members except for Indonesia. While China is a signatory, 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (hereinafter ―FCTC‖) has 
only been extended in a very limited way to Hong Kong.
69
 
The fact that Indonesia is not a signatory leaves the most populous nation 
in ASEAN outside the health-protection obligations of the FCTC, while the 
rest of ASEAN is bound by them. This has implications as ASEAN negotiates 
trade and investment agreements with its external partners as a bloc (such as 
RCEP) negotiations between ASEAN and six of its major trade partners: 
Australia, China, India, Korea, Japan and New Zealand), or as ASEAN 
members which are FCTC parties negotiate with non-FCTC parties such as 
the US (in the TPP negotiations).
70
 
Divergences in policies may also occur where they are shaped by factors 
such as whether there might be a state entity which is itself involved in 
tobacco production, distribution or sale, e.g. in Thailand and China, and in the 
area of pharmaceuticals, the kind of pharmaceutical production or R&D 
activities occurring in their economies. 
FTA participation can lead to greater liberalization and therefore greater 
movement of goods, services and investments. Extending commitments in 
such agreements to a select and strategically chosen group or sole trading 
partner can speed up negotiations, in contrast to the much more (and 
increasingly) complex trade liberalization negotiations at the WTO. As a 
result, the successful conclusion of negotiations for a bilateral (or regional) 
FTA can bring earlier results, both in terms of implementation and economic 
benefits. However FTAs usually require parties to extend themselves beyond 
what they might have already agreed to at the multilateral level. This requires 
intensive negotiations, both externally and internally, and can give rise to 
negotiating and policy tension as such a push may be made by placing 
sensitive areas on the table. Examples of difficult issues that have arisen in 
                                                          
68  See PARTIES TO THE WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, http://ww 
w.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
69 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 153 (H.K.). See id., China’s entry in the list. 
70 The US has signed but not ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. See 
PARTIES TO THE WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, supra note 68. 
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some Asian FTA negotiations include government procurement, intellectual 
property rights protection, and regulation of pharmaceutical and tobacco 
products. 
Apart from real economic benefits that may arise from FTA participation, 
given the rapid rise in Asian FTAs, a fear of being left out of preferential trade 
and investment opportunities can constitute a real incentive for some states to 
initiate their own FTA negotiations. This is because FTA preferences are not 
required by states to be extended to other trade partners on a most-favored 
nation (MFN) basis and are a recognized avenue of non-MFN preferential 
treatment under WTO rules.
71
 In particular, the allure of large preferential 
trading blocs such as those that might arise under the TPP, TTIP and RCEP, 
encourage states to join the ―bandwagon‖. 
For some Asian states, FTAs are not simply about economic 
considerations, but may encompass broader, geopolitical concerns. As the 
Chief Negotiator of Singapore for the USSFTA, Ambassador Tommy Koh, 
explained: 
Singapore wants an FTA with the U.S. for a combination of 
economic and strategic reasons. The U.S. is Singapore’s largest 
foreign investor and second largest trading partner. The U.S. is also 
Singapore’s most important source of technology and management 
know-how. Singapore’s interest in the U.S., however, transcends 
business and economics. Singapore wishes to entrench the presence 
of the U.S. in the region because it underpins the security of the 
whole Asia-Pacific region. Singapore regards the U.S.-Singapore 
FTA as a symbol of continued U.S. commitment to the region. 
Therefore, for Singapore, the USSFTA is not just about securing 
tariff-free entry for Singapore’s exports to the U.S. market. It is not 
just about attracting more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to 
Singapore. It is also about enhancing the prospects of peace and 
stability in the region.
72
 
  
                                                          
71 See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV.  
72 Tommy T.B. Koh, The USSFTA: A Personal Perspective, in THE UNITED STATES SINGAPORE FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT — HIGHLIGHTS AND INSIGHTS 3, 7-8 (Tommy T. B. Koh, & Li Lin Chang eds., 
2004). 
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V.  TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND ADDRESSING PUBLIC HEALTH 
REGULATION CONCERNS73 
A. Negotiations and Trade-offs 
Public authorities need to strike a balance between trade, non-trade 
benefits, and any disbenefits of entering a FTA, especially where the 
counter-Party’s negotiating demands include a significant change to the 
existing system. An example would be public health regulations such as those 
affecting how medicines are approved, marketed and sold, and who may do so. 
Another would be balancing trade liberalization by removal of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers with respect to tobacco products against existing tobacco 
control laws, policies and international obligations. The demands of 
negotiation may require considering changes that bring a risk of higher 
pharmaceutical prices. Finally, the potential application of investor-State 
dispute settlements (such as arbitration) to such provisions raise the potential 
of costly and high-profile disputes brought by investors. 
Authorities through internal consultation often make a final decision that 
consists of a mix of economic and political considerations. As a result, one 
question that Asian treaty negotiators often have to consider is how the 
product of the final decision will affect the country in the long term, 
especially where a treaty carries investor-State dispute possibilities. In coming 
to a decision on final trade-offs, a negotiator may have to deal with the 
tension of the potential trade-investment/public health interface, such as 
where TRIPS-plus provisions not hitherto part of the national system are 
being demanded. An Asian state may therefore aim to agree to necessary 
trade-offs but find it necessary to ask for safe harbor provisions in order to 
strengthen the quid pro quo. An example that could help ameliorate with the 
tension could be the inclusion of a clear provision for regulatory discretion for 
health (e.g. through GATT-type exceptions) or a request for specific 
carve-outs for certain measures from the dispute settlement, to reduce the risk 
of legal exposure. 
In this connection, the US-Colombia FTA provides the following 
provision of interest: 
1. The Parties affirm their commitment to the Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2).  
                                                          
73 On the sources of tension in regulating health and trade, see, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & 
GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY 268-94 (2009); some such sources identified 
specifically in the pharmaceutical context in Chapter 10. 
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2. The Parties have reached the following understandings regarding 
this Chapter.  
(a) The obligations of this Chapter do not and should not prevent a 
Party from taking measures to protect public health by promoting 
access to medicines for all, in particular concerning cases such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well as 
circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency. 
Accordingly, while reiterating their commitment to this Chapter, 
the Parties affirm that this Chapter can and should be interpreted 
and implemented in a manner supportive of each Party’s right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.  
(b) In recognition of the commitment to access to medicines that 
are supplied in accordance with the Decision of the General 
Council of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph Six 
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (WT/L/540) and the WTO General Council Chairman’s 
statement accompanying the Decision (JOB(03)/177, WT/GC/M/82) 
(collectively, the ―TRIPS/health solution‖), this Chapter does not 
and should not prevent the effective utilization of the TRIPS/health 
solution. . . . (Emphasis added) 
The KAFTA
74
 also contains an express provision that when interpreting 
and implementing the key patent obligations provision, Art. 13.8, the parties 
―are entitled to rely upon the Doha Declaration‖. 
While such provisions have not been tested before a tribunal, this 
provides an express interpretative directive that is clearly related to public 
health goals. 
VI. ASEAN INTEGRATION: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR JOINT 
DISCUSSION AND CONVERGENCE ON HEALTH GOALS AND 
REGULATORY STANCES 
For the diverse members of ASEAN, the ASEAN Economic Community 
(hereinafter ―AEC‖) is in the process of formation and is expected to come 
about by the end of 2015; there is a comprehensive implementation plan.
75
 At 
                                                          
74 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic 
of Korea, art. 13.10, Dec. 12, 2014, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/kafta/official-docume 
nts/Pages/default.aspx.  
75 See Bali Concord III, supra note 15. 
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the same time ASEAN is seeking further economic integration with six of its 
key regional trade partners in the negotiations for a RCEP.
76
 
In the area of intellectual property policy, while ASEAN has developed 
an IP Action Plan
77
 there has been no explicit linkage between IP 
development and treatment of pharmaceutical patents and compulsory 
licensing by members. Directions for initiatives on affordable healthcare are 
also not expressly linked to IP policy. There has been no publicly-articulated 
common FTA negotiating stance on provisions which may affect tobacco 
control. Recently ASEAN leaders did however expressly resolve to ensure 
access to affordable healthcare, and affordable medicines (see below).
78
 
The objective of providing affordable healthcare, and affordable 
medicines in particular, has become an increasing explicit one in recent 
ASEAN integration instruments, such as in Ministerial declarations and 
integration agenda. While the AEC plans to address economic integration, 
healthcare and related goals and initiatives fall under the purview of the 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (hereinafter ―ASCC‖): this group sets out 
the specific actions and initiatives to be carried out for such goals.
79
 
Specifically, the ASCC states as one of its ―Strategic Objectives‖: ―Ensure 
access to adequate and affordable healthcare, medical services and medicine, 
and promote healthy lifestyles for the peoples of ASEAN‖.
80
 (Emphasis 
added) 
In a recent Ministerial Declaration, the following significant joint 
aspirations were expressed by ASEAN leaders: 
Consistent with the purposes and principles of ASEAN basic instruments 
to promote health, science and technology, education, human resources, 
cultural heritage, and the high quality of life, ASEAN resolves at the global 
level to: ―a. Ensure access to adequate and affordable healthcare, medical 
services, as well as accessibility to safe, non-counterfeit, affordable, and 
effective medication . . . .‖ (Emphasis added)
 81
 
There is scope for tension in at least two areas, in implementing the above 
objectives. First, the relative appetite of ASEAN governments for increasing 
TRIPS-plus protection (such as for pharmaceutical patents and related rights 
such as data protection) differs according to their national systems.  
                                                          
76 See REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 9. 
77 The Action Plan does aim to develop a ―strong negotiating position‖ via a ―minimum‖ negotiating 
framework for IPRs, though. ASEAN Working Group on Intellectual Property Cooperation, ASEAN 
Intellectual Property Rights Action Plan 2011-2015, ¶ 25 (2012), http://119.252.161.170/ksp 
/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/asean.pdf. 
78 Bali Concord III, supra note 15, ¶ C.3 (a). 
79  See ROADMAP FOR AN ASEAN COMMUNITY 2009-2015, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
NATIONS, ¶¶ B4-B5 (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www.asean.org/images/2012/publications 
/RoadmapASEA NCommunity.pdf.  
80 Id. ¶ B4. 
81 Bali Concord III, supra note 15, ¶ C.3(a) 
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Secondly, ASEAN members desire increased foreign investment and 
trade but will need to manage the affordability of medicines along with any 
changes economic integration and increasing FTA activity may bring. 
ASEAN members (other than Indonesia) will also need to ensure a balance 
between health regulation policies and economic obligations expressed in 
bilateral and regional trade and investment instruments. The strong integration 
objective in ASEAN could provide an opportunity for greater dialogue as well 
as development of a joint stance in how to deal with this interface and with 
trade negotiations that may affect it. Other countries such as China and India, 
with their large populations and their own economic challenges, will no doubt 
also need to carefully consider how to manage the health-trade-investment 
nexus in regulatory policies in accordance with their needs, circumstances and 
priorities. 
VII. PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS AND NEGOTIATING STANCES 
Immediate development of a common, integrated negotiating stance 
across Asia is probably unrealistic, given the diverse stages of economic 
development, policy priorities and public health needs throughout the region. 
This does not, however, mean that it is not useful to identify steps toward 
crafting a set of common issues faced in FTA negotiations. The merits in such 
an exercise would be three-fold: first it can provide negotiators and 
policy-makers in Asia with a convenient reference set of questions to consider 
before and during negotiations. Secondly, it would serve as a negotiating 
template for addressing both economic and public health priorities at the 
negotiating table. Thirdly, in some quarters, public health impact assessment 
exercises are already being used to ensure that public health implications of 
economic treaty commitments are properly addressed when negotiating trade 
agreements. Such exercises could be incorporated into treaty negotiation 
preparations as a matter of good practice. Such tools would also better prepare 
negotiators for future ―mega‖ treaties that may be negotiated, whether 
multilaterally, or in the context of a possible Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (hereinafter ―FTAAP‖). 
In the ASEAN integration context, even if there is no immediate 
convergence of policies on the interface between trade, investment and health 
interface policies at the moment, there is an opportunity to identify a 
convergence of purpose(s) in this nexus. The global community is already 
debating how to deal with this interface in order to attain balanced and 
coherent-policy making. Within Asia, ASEAN, at least, in aspiring to speak 
with one voice in the global platform,
82
 should seize this opportunity of a 
                                                          
82 Id.; Bali Concord III, supra note 15, Preamble. 
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nascent Economic Community identity to forge a clear and coherent stance. 
For a start, the Plan of Action for the Bali Concord III has started a discussion 
on the need for examining the implications of the trade-health interface with a 
view to developing common strategies. It, states that one of ASEAN’s 
planned actions is to: ―Improve awareness on the impact of regional and global 
trade policies and economic integration on health and develop possible 
strategies to mitigate their negative impacts.‖
83
 
ASEAN’s regular dialogues and ongoing trade negotiations (such as those 
for RCEP) with its major Asian trade partners, China, India, Japan and Korea, 
can also provide opportunities to discuss this interface and the similar as well 
as different challenges faced. At the same time, certain ASEAN countries are 
participating in the TPP negotiations,
84 
in which intellectual property rights 
and health-related regulatory issues (such as regulation of tobacco and 
pharmaceutical products) potentially form part of new, possibly stricter, 
commitments than in prior agreements. 
The following are some practical steps that could be taken toward this end. 
First, it is necessary to identify common interests and common priority health 
goals across borders, first within ASEAN, and broadly, among Asian trade 
partners. Given that there are diverse economic and public health needs within 
Asia, and even within the sub-set of ASEAN, such a first step will create a 
common platform for better collaborative and coordinated regulatory 
responses. Secondly, it is imperative to identify and express common, 
necessary regulatory space for public health measures in trade and investment 
treaty negotiations. Thirdly, when negotiating trade treaties it may be useful to 
consider the adoption of an approach that utilizes public health impact 
assessments. Such a step would provide objective insight into the public 
health implications of proposed trade obligations. Fourthly, a helpful step 
would be discussion and design for inclusion in trade/investment treaties of 
non-contentious, problem-solving dispute settlement methods with regard to 
health-related regulation disputes. This would ensure that lasting and 
innovative solutions that are oriented toward meeting trade and health goals 
can be worked out. It is submitted that such steps can help policy-makers 
bring about greater coherence to better handle tensions arising from the 
trade-investment-public health interface as it arises in domestic rule-making 
and treaty-making 
                                                          
83 ASEAN, Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations ―Bali 
Concord III‖ Plan of Action 2013-2017, ¶ 3(a)(xiv) (2012), http://www.kemlu.go.id/ptri-asean/Ma 
gazines/Bal i%20Plan%20of%20Action%20Three.pdf. 
84 The ASEAN countries participating in the TPP negotiations are Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Vietnam. Outside of ASEAN, Japan is also a TPP negotiating party. Significantly, 
China, Korea and India are not TPP negotiating parties; however, plans have been announced to 
explore a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP); see ANNEX A – THE BEIJING ROADMAP FOR 
APEC’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE REALIZATION OF THE FTAAP, supra note 10. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
As countries in the Asian region engage in more negotiations for trade 
and investment partnership agreements it can be expected that the trade and 
health interface will be a recurring issue. This is particularly true given the 
diversity in economic and health policies in these countries, and their 
negotiating counterparts. As ambitious agreements such as the TPP and in 
time to come, perhaps the FTAAP throw the trade-health interface into even 
sharper relief, economies grapple with the difficult task of balancing the 
desire for economic growth and investment with ensuring affordable and 
accessible healthcare and pharmaceuticals for their citizenry. Already, a 
number of flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement have been limited in 
certain FTAs, such as in the areas of patentability, pre-grant opposition 
opportunities in patent applications, data exclusivity and patent linkages. For 
ASEAN, as it evolves toward greater integration and development of a 
common voice on global issues, it will be particularly important to consider 
what that voice will say with regard to negotiating trade and public health 
issues. A number of useful steps as outlined above can already be taken in this 
regional context to set the scene for better informed and possibly, common, 
negotiation stances. 
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